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INTRODUCTION

Due process is a fundamental concept in the United States' legal
system. At the same time, however, it is probably one of the most amorphous and sometimes misunderstood. For lawyers trained in the United
States, "due process" becomes a phrase with special meaning resulting
from the study of a number of judicial decisions, especially those of the
U.S. Supreme Court. For lay persons, and for lawyers from other countries, discussions of "due process" may not always provide a clear un-
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derstanding of what that phrase means in the U.S. legal system. This paper discusses the historical development of the concept of due process in
U.S. law, particularly as it relates to issues of jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in U.S. courts.
It is important from the outset to note that, like many aspects of
amendments to the United States Constitution, the Due Process Clauses
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments provide limitations on the federal and state governments. They exist to protect individuals from excessive exercises of governmental authority. In a discussion of judicial jurisdiction, this means the Due Process Clauses restrict the extent to which
courts may exercise jurisdiction over a defendant. In a discussion of
treaty negotiations, these clauses place similar limitations on the ability
of the United States government to agree to rules of jurisdiction that
might result in the denial of due process to a defendant in specific litigation. Any treaty to which the United States becomes a party is subject to
the U.S. Constitution, and a court may refuse to apply a treaty provision
if to do otherwise would deny a right granted in the Constitution.
In an effort to clarify the concept of due process as it applies to judicial jurisdiction in U.S. courts, and the limits that concept places on the
United States government in its relations with other nations, this paper
begins with a historical look at the term itself, including a discussion of
the major U.S. Supreme Court decisions applying the Due Process
Clauses to the exercise of jurisdiction to adjudicate. Each decision is considered in enough detail to acquaint the reader with both the facts and
the major elements of the opinion. The next section discusses the due
process implications of jurisdictional issues under the Brussels Convention (including specific types of jurisdiction noted with disfavor in Article 3), and considers whether a U.S. court could constitutionally exercise
jurisdiction on some of the bases dealt with in the Brussels Convention.
The final section of the paper explains that due process limitations on jurisdiction result also in limitations on the negotiating authority of the
United States in the effort to achieve a multilateral convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments at the Hague
Conference on Private International Law. These limitations will have an
effect on the lists of required and prohibited bases of jurisdiction contained in any such convention.
Due process is, of course, a concept important beyond the borders
of the United States, and the positions taken by the U.S. Supreme Court
may not reflect what some believe to be international standards discussed
under the rubric of due process. The discussion in this paper is not in-
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tended to imply a judgment about the fairness of other systems of law. It
is offered merely to explain the application of the U.S. Constitution in
order to let others know and understand the limitations the Constitution,
and its interpretation in U.S. courts, places on the United States in the
negotiation of a multilateral treaty on jurisdiction and the recognition of
judgments.

II. DuE PRocEss AND JURISDICION INUNITED STATES COURTS
The history and nature of judicial application of the Due Process
Clauses as applied to concepts of jurisdiction to adjudicate sometimes
lead to assumptions that those clauses provide for expansive jurisdictional
authority. While the language used in some cases may have authorized
jurisdiction beyond previously assumed limits, this does not mean the
Due Process Clauses can be considered as grants of authority. As the following discussion indicates, most grants of judicial authority in U.S.
courts come from state "long-arm" statutes, which set forth specific bases of jurisdiction. The Due Process Clause-particularly that in the
Fourteenth Amendment-limits the exercise of such authority. No state
or federal court may exercise jurisdiction in a manner that would deny a
defendant the fundamental rights of due process. Nor may the United
States Government agree to multilateral rules on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments that would allow the exercise of
jurisdiction by U.S. courts (or the recognition of judgments resulting
from a similar exercise of jurisdiction by foreign courts) in a manner that
would deny such fundamental rights.
A.

The Origins of Due Process in American Jurisprudence

The concept of due process was not new either to the Fourteenth
Amendment, 1 or even the earlier Fifth Amendment 2 to the U.S. Constitution. Its first prominent use appears to have been in a 1354 English statute, which provided: "[N]o man of what estate or condition that he be,
shall be put out of land or tenement, nor taken nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor put to death, without being brought in answer by due process
of the law."' 3 Sir Edward Coke tied the use of the term "due process" in
1. The Fourteenth Amendment, ratified on July 9, 1868, provides that no State shall "deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. The Fifth Amendment, ratified with the first ten Amendments, which comprised the Bill of
Rights and became effective December 15, 1791, provided that, "[n]o person shall ... be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3. 28 Edw. III, ch. 3 (1354) (Eng.). For a discussion of the history of due process, and specifi-
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this provision, not to specific writs allowed in the courts, but rather to
the phrase "Law of the Land" in the Magna Charta, which provides
that,
[n]o Freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised of his Freehold, or Liberties, or free Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor
will we not pass upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful Judgement of his
Peers, or by the Law of the Land

Thus, "[i]n Coke's view, the phrase 'due process of law' referred to the
customary procedures to which freemen were entitled by 'the old law of
England.'
This concept was evident in the constitutions in the new
states formed from former colonies. For example, the North Carolina
",5

Constitution of 1776 provides that: "[N]o freeman ought to be taken, imprisoned or disseized of his Freehold, Liberties or Privileges, or outlawed
or exiled, or in any Manner destroyed or deprived of his Life, Liberty, or
Property, but by the Law of the Land." 6 Thus, the first U.S. Due Process
Clause, that in the Fifth Amendment, traces its lineage to the Magna
Charta, in providing that "[n]o person shall be... deprived of life, lib'7
erty, or property, without due process of law."
The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause received little judicial attention in the early years of U.S. history. The first Supreme Court discussion of any length came in 1856, in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land &
Improvement Co. 8 While this case dealt with the validity of a federal statute, and not with issues of judicial jurisdiction, 9 the Supreme Court specally its application to punitive damages, see Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S.
1, 28-40 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
4.

2 Sm EDwARD COKE,INsrTums 50 (London, Flesher & Young, 1642). This phrase is found

in Chapter 29 of the Magna Charta (Chapter 39 of the original Magna Charta signed by King John
at Runnymede in 1215). See 9 Hen. M, ch. 29 (1225) (Eng.).
5. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 28 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (citing CoKE, supra note 4, at 50).
6. N.C. CoasT. art. XII (1776). See also MAss. CoNsr. art. XII (1780) ("[N]o subject shall be
arrested, imprisoned, despoiled, or deprived of his property, immunities, or privileges, put out of the
protection of the law, exiled, or deprived of his life, liberty, or estate, but by the judgment of his
peers, or the law of the land.").
7. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 29 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (citing 2 WniAM BLAcKsToNE. CoMMENTARuEs 133 nn.11, 12 (S.Tucker ed., 1803); 2 JAmESs KENT. COMMENTARIES ON AMERicAN LAw 10
(1827); 3 JosEPH STORY, CommerARmEs ON THE CONsrrrtmnON OF THE UrnIED STATES 661 (1833)).
8. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
9. The federal statute challenged in Murray's Lessee authorized the issuance of distress warrants by the government to collect debts without providing a debtor with notice or any opportunity
for a hearing. See id.
at 278-279. In this regard, the "process" addressed has parallels to the notice
element of jurisdictional discussions. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306 (1950).
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cifically noted that the words "due process of law" in the Fifth Amendment have "the same meaning as the words, 'by the law of the land,' in
Magna Charta," thus imposing "a restraint on the legislative as well as
on the executive and judicial powers of the government."10 This concept
of due process as a limitation on government is fundamental to the understanding of its use in decisions on judicial jurisdiction.
Justice Scalia has focused on the portion of the opinion in Murray's
Lessee that emphasizes a long history of uninterrupted practice as evidence of what constitutes due process." Thus, if we have done it a certain way for a long time (and particularly if it was done that way in England even before we did it in the U.S.), then it meets the test of due
process. Scalia supports this position by tracing the analysis from Fifth
Amendment to Fourteenth Amendment cases, including Hurtado v. California,12 which, in Scalia's words, "clarified the proper role of history in
a due process analysis: If the government chooses to follow a historically
approved procedure, it necessarily provides due process, but if it chooses
to depart from historical practice, it does not necessarily deny due process." ' 13 While the language of Hurtado quoted by Justice Scalia in
reaching this conclusion specifically noted that longstanding practice
alone did not make divergence from that practice a denial of due process, 14 in referring to the practice of awarding punitive damages, he concluded that "no procedure firmly rooted in the practices of our people
can be so 'fundamentally unfair' as to deny due process of law."' 5 This
focus on past practice as evidence of due process has suffered erosion in
recent times, with the felt need to adapt concepts of due process to modem society. 16 Even the specific example of punitive damages, which was
10. Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. at 276. See also Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 93 (1876)
("Due process of law is process due according to the law of the land.").
II. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 30 (Scalia, J., concurring).
12. 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
13. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 31-32 (Scalia, J., concurring).
14. See id. at 31 (quoting Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 528-529).
The real syllabus of [the relevant portion of Murray's Lessee] is, that a process of law, which
is not otherwise forbidden, must be taken to be due process of law, if it can show the sanction of settled usage both in England and in this country; but it by no means follows that
nothing else can be due process of law.... mo hold that such a characteristic is essential to
due process of law, would be to deny every quality of the law but its age, and to render it
incapable of progress or improvement. It would be to stamp upon our jurisprudence the unchangeableness attributed to the laws of the Medes and Persians.
Id.
15. Id. at 38.
16. See, e.g., the discussion of jurisdiction over defendants in a mobile society, infra note 62
and accompanying text.
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the context for Justice Scalia's dissertation on the history of due process,
has experienced a change sufficient to see Scalia's historical approach
7
more recently stated in a dissent rather than in a concurring opinion.'
B. The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and Questions of
Jurisdiction
1.

Pennoyer v. Neff: territorialconcepts of jurisdiction

The application of the Due Process Clauses to jurisdictional decisions in cases involving foreign defendants in U.S. courts requires an understanding of certain elements of the federal system. First, concepts of
vertical federalism (i.e., federal-state relations) require that unless the
matter before a court is based on a federal statute, the relevant Due Process Clause is that in the Fourteenth Amendment, which is applicable to
the states. Second, concepts of horizontal federalism (state-state relations)
are implicated in that the vast majority of cases that apply the Due Process Clause to "foreign" defendants deal with defendants from other
U.S. states, not defendants from other nations. Thus, rules applicable to
non-U.S. defendants have been developed largely in cases involving parties from different U.S. states, applying the clause as a limitation on the
"sovereignty" of the U.S. state exercising judicial jurisdiction.
The discussion of due process and jurisdiction in U.S. courts generally begins with the 1877 case of Pennoyer v. Neff.'3 A resident of California (Neff) had acquired title to land in Oregon through a grant from
the government, issued in 1866 under the 1850 Donation Law of Oregon. 19 When Pennoyer purchased the same property at a sheriff's sale resulting from an Oregon lawyer's execution on the property to satisfy unpaid fees, Neff brought an action to recover possession, claiming that the
sale had resulted from proceedings in which service was effected by publication, and not by personal service, with no appearance in the action by
17. While Scalia's historical approach quoted above was set forth in an opinion concurring
with the majority opinion which upheld a punitive damages award in Haslip, 499 U.S. at 28-40
(Scalia, J., concurring), his historical analysis led to his dissent in BMW of North America, Inc. v
Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), where the majority of the court held a punitive damages award to be so
excessive as to violate due process. See id. at 598-607 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
18. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). "Rightly or wrongly, Pennoyer v. Neff, linked American jurisdictional
law with the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, and however questionable that linkage
may be, it has become part of American conventional wisdom." Friedrich K. Juenger, Constitutionalizing German JurisdictionalLaw, 44 Am. J. CoNtp. L. 521, 521 (1996) (book review) (footnotes
omitted).
19. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 719-720.
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Neff.20 Justice Field's opinion for the U.S. Supreme Court focused on a
territorial approach to jurisdiction over the defendant, 21 looking for the
presence of the defendant within the territory, and enunciating "two
well-established principles of public law respecting the jurisdiction of an
independent State over persons and property": "One of these principles
is, that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over
persons and property within its territory.... The other principle ... is,
that no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons
or property without its territory."2 On appeal, the Supreme Court held
that the Oregon court rendering the judgment against Neff, upon which
the sheriff's sale had been based, was without jurisdiction over Neff, and
thus the judgment was invalid.23 This was required by the application of
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause to in personan jurisdiction. 24 Justice Field suggested that territorial concepts did not forbid service by publication where jurisdiction was in rem (i.e., limited to the
property involved), even if the property involved was that of a nonresident32 As to jurisdiction that would bind the defendant beyond the interest in the property used to establish in rem jurisdiction, however, due
process clearly required something more.
20. See id.
21. See id. at 720.
The authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in
which it is established. Any attempt to exercise authority beyond those limits would be
deemed in every other forum, as has been said by this court, an illegitimate assumption of
power, and be resisted as mere abuse.
Id.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 722.
See id. at 734.
See id. at 733.
Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, the validity
of such judgments may be directly questioned, and their enforcement in the State resisted, on
the ground that proceedings in a court of justice to determine the personal rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction do not constitute due process of law.
Id.
25. See id.
Except in cases affecting the personal status of the plaintiff, and cases in which that
mode of service may be considered to have been assented to in advance, as hereinafter mentioned, the substituted service of process by publication, allowed by the law of Oregon and
by similar laws in other States, where actions are brought against non-residents, is effectual
only where, in connection with process against the person for commencing the action, property in the State is brought under the control of the court, and subjected to its disposition by
process adapted to that purpose, or where the judgment is sought as a means of reaching such
property or affecting some interest therein; in other words, where the action is in the nature
of a proceeding in rem.
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In Milliken v. Meyer,26 the Court held that a Wyoming domiciliary,
served personally in Colorado, was properly subject to the jurisdiction of
the courts of Wyoming on the basis of domicile:
Domicile in the state is alone sufficient to bring an absent defendant within the
reach of the state's jurisdiction for purposes of a personal judgment by means of
appropriate substituted service. Substituted service in such cases has been quite
uniformly upheld where the absent defendant was served at his usual place of
abode in the state . . . as well as where he was personally served without the
state."

Thus, a rule was established similar to the general jurisdictional rule
found in Article 2 of the Brussels Convention: a defendant is subject to
28
jurisdiction at his or her domicile, regardless of where service occurs.
2.

Long-arm statutes and due process analysis

Analysis of in personam jurisdiction in U.S. courts generally involves a two-step process. The first step is the application of the state
long-arm statute, to determine if there is statutory jurisdiction. These statutes differ, but they generally can be categorized as list-type provisions,
providing specific bases of jurisdiction, 29 and the constitutional limits
26.

311 U.S. 457 (1940).

27. Id. at 462-63 (citations omitted).
28. See European Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters of 27 September 1968, art. 2, 1978 OJ. (L 304) 36, reprinted as amended at
1990 O.J. (C 189) 1, 29 I.L.M. 1413, 1418 [hereinafter Brussels Convention]. This Convention is
also subject to the Convention on the accession of the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland
and the Kingdom of Sweden of 29 November 1996, 1997 O.J. (C 15) 1.
29. New York and Pennsylvania both have such statutes.
§ 302. Personal Jurisdiction by Acts of Non-domiciliaries
(a) Acts which are the basis of jurisdiction. As to a cause of action arising from any of
the acts enumerated in this section, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nondomiciliary, or his executor or administrator, who in person or through an agent:
1. transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods
or services in the state; or
2. commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising from the act; or
3. commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property
within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising

from the act, if he
(i) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent
course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed
or services rendered, in the state, or
(ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in
the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce; or
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4. owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the state.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302 (McKinney 1990). Section 302 is limited to what has become referred to as "specific jurisdiction" ("transacting business" in New York terminology) in which the cause of action
must "arise out of" the defendant's connection with the state. See infra note 44 and accompanying
text. Section 301 of the Civil Practice Laws & Rules incorporates "general jurisdiction" ("doing
business" in New York terminology) by authorizing a court to "exercise such jurisdiction over persons, property, or status as might have been exercised" before the enactment of the C.P.L.R. Id§ 301. Thus, if the cause of action does not arise out of a transaction of business in New York, "jurisdiction may be acquired only if the foreign corporation is doing business in the traditional sense,
i.e., it must do business 'not occasionally or casually, but with a fair measure of permanence and
continuity.' " Id. C301:2, at 9 (quoting Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915, 917 (1917)).
The first provision of Pennsylvania's long-ann statute limits jurisdiction to actions arising out of
the jurisdictional nexus, but then a second provision extends the reach as far as permitted under the
United States Constitution.
§ 5322. Bases of personal jurisdiction over persons outside this Commonwealth
(a) General rule.-A tribunal of this Commonwealth may exercise personal jurisdiction
over a person (or the personal representative of a deceased individual who would be subject
to jurisdiction under this subsection if not deceased) who acts directly or by an agent, as to a
cause of action or other matter arising from such person:
(I) Transacting any business in this Commonwealth. Without excluding other acts
which may constitute transacting business in this Commonwealth, any of the following
shall constitute transacting business for the purpose of this paragraph:
(i) The doing by any person in this Commonwealth of a series of similar
acts for the purpose of thereby realizing pecuniary benefit or otherwise accomplishing an object.
(ii) The doing of a single act in this Commonwealth for the purpose of
thereby realizing pecuniary benefit or otherwise accomplishing an object with
the intention of initiating a series of such acts.
(iii) The shipping of merchandise directly or indirectly into or through this
Commonwealth.
(iv) The engaging in any business or profession within this Commonwealth, whether or not such business requires license or approval by any government unit of this Commonwealth.
(v) The ownership, use or possession of any real property situate within
this Commonwealth.
(2) Contracting to supply services or things in this Commonwealth.
(3) Causing harm or tortious injury by an act or omission in this Commonwealth.
(4) Causing harm or tortious injury in this Commonwealth by an act or omission
outside this Commonwealth.
(5) Having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in this
Commonwealth.
(6) (i) Contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this
Commonwealth at the time of contracting.
(ii)
Being a person who controls, or who is a director, officer, employee
or agent of a person who controls, an insurance company incorporated in this
Commonwealth or an alien insurer domiciled in this Commonwealth.
(iii) Engaging in conduct described in section 504 of the act of May 17,
1921 (P.L. 789, No. 285), known as "The Insurance Department Act of 1921."
(7) Accepting election or appointment or exercising powers under the authority of
this Commonwealth as a:
(i) Personal representative of a decedent.
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statutes, providing that a court in the state can exercise in personam jurisdiction to the limits of the Due Process Clause.3? The process of apply-

ing a list-type long-arm statute is not unlike the application of the juris-

31
dictional rules of the Brussels Convention.
The second step in the United States is the constitutional analysis by
which it is determined whether the exercise of jurisdiction allowed by
state statute in the particular case is within the limits of the Due Process
Clause. Because it usually is a state long-arm statute that is being considered, it is the Fourteenth Amendment we are most often concerned

with.32

(ii) Guardian of a minor or incompetent.
(iii) Trustee or other fiduciary.
(iv) Director or officer of a corporation.
(8) Executing any bond of any of the persons specified in paragraph (7).
(9) Making application to any government unit for any certificate, license, permit,
registration or similar instrument or authorization or exercising any such instrument or
authorization.
(10) Committing any violation within the jurisdiction of this Commonwealth of
any statute, home rule charter, local ordinance or resolution, or rule or regulation
promulgated thereunder by any government unit or of any order of court or other government unit.
(b) Exercise of full constitutional power over nonresidents.-In addition to the provisions
of subsection (a) the jurisdiction of the tribunals of this Commonwealth shall extend to all
persons who are not within the scope of section 5301 (relating to persons) to the fullest extent allowed under the Constitution of the United States and may be based on the most minimum contact with this Commonwealth allowed under the Constitution of the United States.
(c) Scope of jurisdiction.-When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section, only a cause of action or other matter arising from acts enumerated in subsection (a), or
from acts forming the basis of jurisdiction under subsection (b), may be asserted against him.
(d) Service outside this commonwealth.-When the exercise of personal jurisdiction is
authorized by this section, service of process may be made outside this Commonwealth.
(e) Inconvenient forum.-when a tribunal finds that in the interest of substantial justice
the matter should be heard in another forum, the tribunal may stay or dismiss the matter in
whole or in part on any conditions that may be just.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5322 (West 1981).
30. California's long arm statute and paragraph (b) of Pennsylvania's long-arm statute are examples of constitutional limits statutes. See CAL- CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973) ("A court
of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state
or of the United States."); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5322(b) (West 1981).
31. See Brussels Convention, supra note 28, arts. 5 et seq.
32. Jurisdiction in the federal courts is governed by Rule 4(k) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. This Rule provides three principal jurisdictional authorizations:
(1) Rule 4(k)(1)(A) authorizes a district court to borrow the jurisdictional powers of state
courts in the state where it is located;
(2) Rule 4(k)(1)(D) confirms the availability of any applicable federal statute granting personal jurisdiction; and
(3) Rule 4(k)(2) grants district courts personal jurisdiction to the limits of the [Fifth Amendment] due process clause in certain federal question cases.
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International Shoe: jurisdictionfor a mobile society

Understanding the current status of due process analysis in jurisdictional decisions begins with two cases: International Shoe Co. v. Washington,33 and World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson.14 International
Shoe opened up jurisdiction beyond the territorial limits of Pennoyer v.
Neff, and World-Wide Volkswagen then furnished language asserting anew
the limits of due process, but no longer in terms of territoriality. While
neither case involved a defendant from outside the United States, later
cases involving such foreign defendants have relied on their analyses.
InternationalShoe involved an action brought in a Washington state
court, by the State of Washington Office of Unemployment Compensation, to collect delinquent contributions from a Delaware corporation that
had its offices in St. Louis, Missouri. 35 The corporation had no offices in
Washington, made no contracts there, and maintained no inventory in
GARY B. BoRN, INTERNATIONAL CIviL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES CouRTs 172 (3d ed. 1996). This

most often results in the federal court "borrowing" the state statute under Rule 4(k)(1)(A). See id. at
183-84.
Federal Rules 4(k)(1)(D) and 4(k)(2) focus on a defendant's contacts with the nation as a whole,
and Rule 4(k)(1)(D) allows a federal district court to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant when service of summons is "authorized by a statute of the United States." FED. R. Crv. P. 4(k)(1)(D)-(2).
The U.S. Supreme Court has not directly ruled on this matter. In Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987), Justice O'Connor specifically declined such comment, stating:
[w]e have no occasion here to determine whether Congress could, consistent with the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, authorize federal court personal jurisdiction
over alien defendants based on the aggregate of national contacts, rather than on the contacts
between the defendant and the State in which the federal court sits.
Id. at 113 n.*. Other federal courts have stated that a defendant's nationwide contacts can be considered when Congress has authorized worldwide service of process. See, e.g., Go-Video, Inc. v. Akai
Elec. Co., 885 F.2d 1406, 1414 (9th Cir. 1989). The advisory committee notes to the 1993 revisions
to Federal Rule 4 are considered to limit national jurisdiction to cases involving a federal statute
"over defendants who have significant nationwide contacts but are not subject to jurisdiction in any
state." American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 590 (9th Cir. 1996).
While the analyses under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are generally quite similar, they
can differ. Thus, some federal statutes authorize service anywhere in the United States and have been
held to create jurisdiction in any federal district from which service may emanate. This results in
part from the difference between Federal Rules 4(k)(1)(A) and 4(k)(1)(D), making it possible where
both state and federal claims arise out of the same facts that jurisdiction will be inappropriate under
the Fourteenth Amendment on the state claims but appropriate under the Fifth Amendment on the
federal claims. See, e.g., ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F3d 617, 626-27 (4th Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1364 (1998). This result, however, has been applied "when the defendant is
located within the United States." Id. at 627. Such domestic defendants in federal question cases
"must look primarily to federal venue requirements for protection from onerous litigation." Id.
(quoting Hogue v. Milodon Eng'g, Inc., 736 F.2d 989, 991 (4th Cir. 1984)).
33. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
34. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
35. See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 313-14.
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Washington. 36 It did employ eleven to thirteen salesmen in Washington
from 1937 to 1940, all of whose principal sales activities were confined
to Washington, and whose combined commissions amounted to more
37
than $31,000 per year.
Drawing on both Pennoyer v. Neff and Milliken v. Meyer, the Court
noted the importance of a nexus between the defendant and the forum
state. 38 While Pennoyer represented the historical focus on the presence
of the defendant within the jurisdiction as a "prerequisite to its rendition
of a judgment personally binding him, ' ' 39 Milliken was the source of the
requirement that something less was necessary, and that
due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."'

The need for rules accommodating the fiction of the corporate personality led the Court to focus on the conduct of persons acting on behalf of the corporation. 41 It noted two variables in determining the constitutionality of jurisdiction over non-resident defendants. The first is the
extent and intensity of the defendant's activities in the forum state, and
the second is the connection between those activities and the cause of action. 42 "Continuous and systematic" activity supports general jurisdiction
over a defendant, allowing a court to consider actions against the defendant whether or not they arise out of those activities. 43 A "single or isolated" contact, on the other hand, will (at most) support only specific jurisdiction, and the action must arise out of the contact. 44
36.
37.
38.
39.

See id.
See id. at 313.
See id. at 316.
Id.

40. Id. (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
41.

See id.

42. See id. at 316-20.
43. Id. at 317.
"Presence" in the state in this sense has never been doubted when the activities of the
corporation there have not only been continuous and systematic, but also give rise to the liabilities sued on, even though no consent to be sued or authorization to an agent to accept service of process has been given. Conversely it has been generally recognized that the casual
presence of the corporate agent or even his conduct of single or isolated items of activities in
a state in the corporation's behalf are not enough to subject it to suit on causes of action unconnected with the activities there.
Id. (citations omitted).
44. Id. The distinction between general and specific jurisdiction was first suggested in Arthur
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Ultimately, the Court found that the activities of the defendant in the
State of Washington were "systematic and continuous," and resulted "in
a large volume of interstate business, in the course of which appellant received the benefits and protection of the laws of th6 state," and that the
obligation sued upon "arose out of those very activities." 45 Thus, it was
"evident that these operations establish sufficient contacts or ties with the
state of the forum to make it reasonable and just, according to our traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice," to permit
jurisdiction. 46
One problem with the minimum contacts test of InternationalShoe
is that there is no bright line rule for determining when the threshold is
crossed on the spectrum from activities not sufficient to support general
jurisdiction to those that are sufficient.47 Further, even though the Court
stated that "substantial and continuous" activities existed, and that such
activities were sufficient to justify jurisdiction even in the absence of a
direct nexus with the cause of action involved (i.e., general jurisdiction),
it also stated that the cause of action sued upon did arise out of those
very activities (i.e., specific jurisdiction). Thus, the facts supported the
assertion of either general or specific jurisdiction.
4.

The road from International Shoe to World-Wide Volkswagen

After International Shoe, and on the way to World-Wide Volkswagen, the Supreme Court decided several cases that also play roles in
the semantics of due process jurisdictional analysis. A case dealing more
with concepts of notice, but also important to jurisdictional analysis, is
Mullane v. CentralHanover Bank & Trust Co.48 A trust company in New
York petitioned for judicial settlement of its accounts for a common trust
T. Von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV.
L. REv. 1121, 1144-64 (1966).
45. InternationalShoe, 326 U.S. at 320.
46. Id.
47. See id.at 319.
It is evident that the criteria by which we mark the boundary line between those activities which justify the subjection of a corporation to suit, and those which do not, cannot be
simply mechanical or quantitative. The test is not merely, as has sometimes been suggested,
whether the activity, which the corporation has seen fit to procure through its agents in another state, is a little more or a little less. Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather
upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of
the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure.
Id. (citations omitted).
48. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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fund under a New York statute that required only notice by publication. 49
Mullane, appointed as a special guardian for known and unknown parties, alleged that the court lacked jurisdiction over those parties because
the notice procedures were unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.5 0 Citing the need for some reasonable
method of settling the accounts, the Court weighed the interests of the
state in such a settlement against the individual interests "sought to be
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." ' 51 The Court found it to be a
"fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding" that there
be "notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. ' 52 As to unknown persons, notice
by publication was upheld.5 3 As to known persons, however, the Court
required that "within the limits of practicability notice must be such as is
reasonably calculated to reach interested parties." 54
Two years after Mullane, the Court decided Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.,5 5 stating a "doing business" test in finding jurisdiction to exist over a Philippine corporation sued in Ohio, where suit in
the Philippines during World War II was difficult, and where all of the
defendant's files and employee records were located in the corporate
56
president's Ohio home.
In McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.,57 a Texas court refused to recognize a California judgment against a Texas insurance company on behalf of a California insured, where jurisdiction was based on
the existence of an insurance policy originally issued by a predecessor
Arizona corporation to the California insured. Neither corporation had offices or agents in California, and the policy was purchased by mail, with
all premiums paid by mail from California to the successor insurance
company's Texas office.5 8 The beneficiary sued for the proceeds when the
insurance company claimed suicide of the insured as a defense to
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

See iiiat 309.
See iL at 311.
Ia at 314.
Id.
See id. at 317.
Id. at 318.
342 U.S. 437 (1952).
See id. at 438-39, 447-48.
355 U.S. 220 (1957).
See id. at 221-22.

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:661

payment.59
The McGee Court returned first to the territorial concepts of Pennoyer, noting that the Fourteenth Amendment places "some limit on the
power of state courts to enter binding judgments against persons not
served with process within their boundaries." 6 It then noted the evolution of due process concepts, acknowledging a "continuing process of
evolution [in which the] Court accepted and then abandoned 'consent,'
'doing business,' and 'presence' as the standard for measuring the extent
of state judicial power over [foreign] corporations. ' 61 The Court concluded that the limitations of Pennoyer had given way to constitutional
acceptance of expanded jurisdiction and gave the reasons for this
acceptance:
Looking back over this long history of litigation a trend is clearly discernible
toward expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other nonresidents. In part this is attributable to the fundamental transformation of our national economy over the years. Today many commercial transactions touch two or more States and may involve parties separated by the full
continent. With this increasing nationalization of commerce has come a great increase in the amount of business conducted by mail across state lines. At the same
time modem transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in economic
activity.62

In a holding not unlike the Brussels Convention provisions designed to
protect insurance consumers, 63 the Court held that the Due Process
Clause did not prevent jurisdiction in the California court, and that "[ilt
is sufficient for purposes of due process that the suit was based on a contract which had substantial connection with that State." 64
59.

See id at 222.

60. Il
61.

Id.

62. Id. at 222-223.
63. See Brussels Convention, supra note 28, arts. 7-12a.
64. McGee, 355 U.S. at 223. The Court further elaborated as follows:
The contract was delivered in California, the premiums were mailed from there and the insured was a resident of that State when he died. It cannot be denied that California has a
manifest interest in providing effective means of redress for its residents when their insurers
refuse to pay claims. These residents would be at a severe disadvantage if they were forced
to follow the insurance company to a distant State in order to hold it legally accountable.
When claims were small or moderate individual claimants frequently could not afford the cost
of bringing an action in a foreign forum-thus in effect making the company judgment proof.
Often the crucial witnesses-as here on the company's defense of suicide-will be found in
the insured's locality. Of course there may be inconvenience to the insurer if it is held amenable to suit in California where it had this contract but certainly nothing which amounts to a
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In Hanson v. Denckla,65 Chief Justice Warren weighed in with an
opinion on the question of jurisdiction in a Florida court over a Delaware
trustee, in order to consider the validity of a trust established by a Delaware settlor who later moved to, and died domiciled in, Florida. 66 The
decision commented on the status of pre-Fourteenth Amendment jurisdictional jurisprudence in leading to a holding that the Florida court lacked
jurisdiction:
Prior to the Fourteenth Amendment an exercise of jurisdiction over persons or
property outside the forum State was thought to be an absolute nullity, but the matter remained a question of state law over which this Court exercised no authority.
With the adoption of that Amendment, any judgment purporting to bind the person
of a defendant over whom the court had not acquired in personam jurisdiction was
void within the State as well as without. 67

Noting the evolution from the "rigid rule" of Pennoyer v. Neff to the
more "flexible standard" of InternationalShoe, 6s Justice Warren refused
to acknowledge "the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal
jurisdiction of state courts." ' 69 Instead, he returned to the territorial concepts of Pennoyer, finding the Due Process Clause to be "more than a
guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation, '70 and no
contacts sufficient to subject the Delaware trust company to Florida court
71
jurisdiction.
Two other aspects of Justice Warren's opinion in Hanson v. Denckla
are worth particular note. First, he specifically rejected the idea that conflicts of law concepts be applied to jurisdictional analysis. 72 Thus, even
denial of due process.
Id. at 223-224.
65. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
66. See id. at 238-39.
67. Id. at 249-50.

68. Id. at 251.
69. Id.
70. Id.

Those restrictions ... are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States. However minimal the burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant may
not be called upon to do so unless he has had the "minimal contacts" with that State that are
a prerequisite to its exercise of power over him.
Id.
71.

See id.

The defendant trust company has no office in Florida, and transacts no business there. None
of the trust assets has ever been held or administered in Florida, and the record discloses no
solicitation of business in that State either in person or by mail.
72.

See id at 254.
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though it might be possible for Florida law to apply to the questions involved in the case, that was not sufficient to result in Florida court jurisdiction. 73 Second, in reverting to a territorial orientation, he reiterated the
need for a nexus between the conduct of the defendant and the forum
state: "[I]t is essential in each case that there be some act by which the
defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of
its laws." 74
Nearly twenty years after Hanson v. Denckla, the Court decided
Shaffer v. Heitner,75 a case in which a nonresident shareholder of a Delaware corporation (Greyhound Corp.) brought a shareholder's derivative
suit in Delaware, alleging violations of fiduciary duties owed by corporate officers in actions resulting in antitrust damages assessed against the
corporation. 76 Under a Delaware statute, the court sequestered property
(shares of stock) of the individual defendants, even though none of the
defendants appeared to be resident in or domiciled in Delaware. 77 Justice
Marshall, speaking for the Court, noted the Court's departure from Pennoyer's concepts of sovereignty, in favor of a focus on "the relationship
among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation. ' 78 He then clearly extended the International Shoe analysis for in personam jurisdiction to in
79
rem jurisdiction.
In Kulko v. Superior Court,0 the Court addressed the question of jurisdiction over a parent in a child custody action under the Due Process
Clause. The mother had moved to California after a Haitian divorce and
a New York agreement that the father (a New York resident) would have
73. See id. at 253. "The issue is personal jurisdiction, not choice of law." Id. at 254.
74. Id. at 253.
75. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
76. See id. at 189-90.
77. See id at 190-91.
78. Id at 204. "The immediate effect of this departure from Pennoyer's conceptual apparatus
was to increase the ability of the state courts to obtain personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants." Id.

79. See id. at 207.
[I]n order to justify an exercise of jurisdiction in rem, the basis for jurisdiction must be sufficient to justify exercising "jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a thing." The standard
for determining whether an exercise of jurisdiction over the interests of persons is consistent
with the Due Process Clause is the minimum-contacts standard elucidated in International
Shoe.
IM. (footnote omitted). "We therefore conclude that all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be
evaluated according to the standards set forth in InternationalShoe and its progeny." Id. at 212.
80. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
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primary custody of the children. 81 She brought an action in California to
establish the Haitian divorce decree and modify the judgment as to child
custody.82 When she sued for custody in California, the father, who had
been in California only twice for a total of four days, argued that the
court lacked jurisdiction over him."
Neither the extremely limited contacts of the defendant with California nor the nature of the case was sufficient to justify jurisdiction in the
eyes of the Court.8 4 The idea that the defendant must have contacts
which in some manner indicate a benefit from the relationship with the
forum state was stated as an important factor: "[Tihe mere act of sending a child to California to live with her mother is not a commercial act
and connotes no intent to obtain or expectancy of receiving a corresponding benefit in the State that would make fair the assertion of that State's
judicial jurisdiction." 8 5
5. World-Wide Volkswagen to Asahi: reasserting and redefining the
limits of jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson

6

was a products liability

lawsuit brought in Oklahoma based on an automobile accident that occurred in that state. An automobile sold in New York to New York residents was being driven through Oklahoma when the accident occurred. 87 The plaintiff sued both World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., a
regional distributer with its office in New York, who distributed to retail
dealers in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut, and Seaway Volk81. See idl at 87.
82. See id.at 88.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 93-94.
"The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant
cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State. .. . [l]t is essential in each
case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails [him]self of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State ...
Id.(quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
We cannot accept the proposition that appellant's acquiescence in [his daughter's] desire to
live with her mother conferred jurisdiction over appellant in the California courts in this action. A father who agrees, in the interests of family harmony and his children's preferences,
to allow them to spend more time in California than was required under a separation agreement can hardly be said to have "purposefully availed himself" of the "benefits and protections" of California's laws.
Id. at 94 (quoting Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 216).
85. Id. at 101.
86. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
87. See iL at 288.
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swagen, Inc., the retail dealer in New York from whom the car had been
purchased. 8 Both of these defendants challenged the jurisdiction of the
89
Oklahoma court.
In holding that the Oklahoma court did not have jurisdiction over
the two defendants, the Supreme Court clearly noted that the Due Process Clause imposed limitations on the ability of states to assert jurisdiction over non-residents. 90 Focusing on minimum contacts as a limiting
factor on jurisdiction, Justice White's opinion stressed both the rights of
defendants and the resulting limitations on state jurisdiction:
As has long been settled, and as we reaffirm today, a state court may exercise
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only so long as there exist "minimum contacts" between the defendant and the forum State. The concept of minimum contacts, in turn, can be seen to perform two related, but distinguishable,
functions. It protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or
inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the States, through their courts, do
not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system. 91

In World-Wide Volkswagen, the contacts with the forum state were
not of the "continuous and systematic" nature of those in International
Shoe.92 Thus, the apparently expansive language of that earlier case was
no longer appropriate. In fact, the two defendants in question had no real
contacts with Oklahoma, other than the fact that an automobile they had
sold-one at wholesale and the other at retail-had made its way into
Oklahoma without any direction or intention on the part of the defendants. 93 Rather than beginning with substantial contacts, the Court was
forced to ask what contacts might exist to support jurisdiction.
Minimum contacts is only the first element of the World-Wide Volkswagen analysis. The second element is the concept of reasonableness
and fairness:
The protection against inconvenient litigation is typically described in terms of
"reasonableness" or "fairness." We have said that the defendant's contacts with
88. See id at 288-89. The plaintiffs also sued the manufacturer, Audi NSU Auto Union Aktiengesellschaft, and its importer, Volkswagen of America, Inc., but those defendants did not take the
issue of jurisdiction to the Oklahoma Supreme Court. See id. at 288 n.3.
89. See id at 288.
90. "The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the power of a state court
to render a valid personal judgment against a nonresident defendant." Id at 291 (citing Kulko, 436
U.S. at 91).
91. Id at 291-92 (citation omitted).
92. See id at 295.
93. See id

1999]

DUE PROCESS AND A HAGUE CONVENTION

the forum State must be such that maintenance of the suit "does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' " The relationship between the
defendant and the forum must be such that it is "reasonable... to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there." 94

This focus on reasonableness led the Court to a balancing test of relevant
factors:
Implicit in this emphasis on reasonableness is the understanding that the burden on
the defendant, while always a primary concern, will in an appropriate case be considered in light of other relevant factors, including the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute; the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective
relief, at least when that interest is not adequately protected by the plaintiff's
power to choose the forum; the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the
most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the several
States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies. 9"

The focus on minimum contacts and reasonableness led Justice
White through the litany of semantic representations of due process analysis. From International Shoe, he drew support for the importance of
contacts with the forum state: "the Due Process Clause 'does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment in personam against
an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts,
ties, or relations.' ",96 Minimum contacts and reasonableness, he found,
are not controlled by, but are tempered by, the concept of foreseeability:
" 'foreseeability' alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause." 97 However,
[t]his is not to say, of course, that foreseeability is wholly irrelevant. But the
foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the mere likelihood that
a product will find its way into the forum State. Rather, it is that the defendant's
conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably
anticipate being haled into court there."'

Ultimately, Justice White made reference to the defendant's own conduct
in creating a nexus with the forum state through the concept of "purposeful availment," and raised the later-to-be troublesome phrase,
"stream of commerce":
94.
(citation
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 292 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1945))
omitted).
Id. (citations omitted).
1d. at 294 (quoting InternationalShoe, 326 U.S. at 319).
Id at 295.
Id at 297.
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When a corporation "purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State," it has clear notice that it is subject to suit there,
and can act to alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation by procuring insurance,
passing the expected costs on to customers, or, if the risks are too great, severing
its connection with the State. . . . The forum State does not exceed its powers
under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation
that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that
they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State.99

Like the concept of "contacts," which was not troublesome to the International Shoe court because the contacts there were viewed as clearly
"systematic and continuous," the concept of a "stream of commerce"
into which the defendant intentionally directs its goods was not troublesome when raised by Justice White in World-Wide Volkswagen. He was
able easily to dismiss any argument that it was the defendants who sent
the automobile on its way to Oklahoma with some related and resulting
benefit to the defendants. 100 The car found its way to Oklahoma, not in
the course of any commercial relationship, but rather as a result of the
conduct of the ultimate consumer.
In the end, Justice White's opinion in World-Wide Volkswagen justifies a denial of jurisdiction by using the same language the Court used in
InternationalShoe to justify affirming jurisdiction. The difference is that
in judging relevant contacts, reasonableness and fairness, foreseeability of
events, purposeful availment of the benefits of the legal system, the various interests of the state and the parties, and the stream of commerce, the
analysis in each instance led the Court to the other side of the allimportant but difficult to quantify threshold between jurisdiction that can
and cannot be upheld under the Due Process Clause.
More recently, the Supreme Court has addressed jurisdictional application of due process analysis to transnational cases, continuing to use
the analytical semantics of International Shoe and World-Wide Volkswagen. In Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,10 ' the
Court addressed a situation where the contacts were neither as "systematic and continuous" as in InternationalShoe, nor as limited as in WorldWide Volkswagen. A wrongful death action was brought in Texas state
court against a Colombian corporation (Helicol) as the result of a helicopter crash in Peru, in which four United States citizens died. 10 2 The
defendant corporation was the alter ego of a Texas joint venture head99.
100.
101.
102.

Id at 297-98 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)) (citation omitted).
See id at 298-99.
466 U.S. 408 (1984).
See id. at 410.
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quartered in Texas. 10 3 Its chief executive officer had negotiated the
purchase in Texas of the helicopters involved in the crash.' t4 Other contacts also existed:
Aside from the negotiation session in Houston.. ., Helicol had other contacts
with Texas. During the years 1970-1977, it purchased helicopters (approximately
80% of its fleet), spare parts, and accessories for more than $4 million from Bell
Helicopter Company in Fort Worth. In that period, Helicol sent prospective pilots
to Fort Worth for training and to ferry the aircraft to South America. It also sent
management and maintenance personnel to visit Bell Helicopter in Fort Worth during the same period in order to receive "plant familiarization" and for technical
consultation. Helicol received into its New York City and Panama City, Fla., bank
accounts over $5 million in payments from Consorcio/WSH drawn upon First City
National Bank of Houston. 0 5

Noting that the Supreme Court could not disturb the Texas Supreme
Court's holding that the Texas long-arm statute encompassed jurisdiction
06
over the defendant, the Court turned to the constitutional analysis.
While the due process analysis by the Texas Supreme Court had focused
on the purchases and related training trips by defendant's employees to
Texas, 10 7 the Supreme Court relied on the 1923 case of Rosenberg Bros.
& Co. v. Curtis Brown Co.10 s (which it determined not to have been repudiated by International Shoe), 10 9 for the proposition that "purchases
and related trips, standing alone, are not a sufficient basis for a State's
assertion of jurisdiction."" 0 Ultimately, the Court held that the combination of existing contacts did not support the constitutional exercise of jurisdiction over the foreign corporation."'
Helicopteros has become perhaps best known for its delineation of
specific and general "doing business" jurisdiction." 2 The Texas long-arm
statute at issue was specifically written to bring within the jurisdiction of
its courts those foreign corporations "doing business" in Texas." 3 On
103.
104.

See id.
See id.

105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 411.
See id. at 413 n.7.
See id. at 417.
260 U.S. 516 (1923).

109.

See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 418.

110. Id.at 417.
111. See id. at 418-19.
112. For the origins of this distinction, see Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 44, at 114464.
113. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 413 n.7. The long-arm statute was TEx. REv. Civ.
art. 2031b (West 1964 & Supp. 1982-1983) (repealed 1985). It read in relevant part:
Sec. 3. Any foreign corporation ...

STAT. ANN.

that engages in business in this State, irrespective of
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specific jurisdiction, Justice Blackmun's opinion noted the following implications of the minimum contacts test of International Shoe: "When a
controversy is related to or 'arises out of' a defendant's contacts with the
forum, the Court has said that a 'relationship among the defendant, the
forum, and the litigation' is the essential foundation of in personam jurisdiction." 114 Thus, specific jurisdiction requires that the cause of action in
litigation "arise out of," and thus be directly related to, the activities of
the defendant within the forum state." 5 The alternative is general
jurisdiction:
Even when the cause of action does not arise out of or relate to the foreign
corporation's activities in the forum State, due process is not offended by a State's
subjecting the corporation to its in personam jurisdiction
when there are sufficient
116
contacts between the State and the foreign corporation.

Thus, so long as the contacts are "continuous and systematic," they may
support jurisdiction even though the cause of action does not "arise out
of" the contacts." 7 The Helicopteros Court found the cause of action at
issue not to have arisen out of the contacts with Texas, thereby avoiding
a discussion of specific jurisdiction." 8 It then ruled that general jurisdiction did not exist under the Due Process Clause.1' 9
A 1985 case, Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 20 did not involve
any Statute or law respecting designation or maintenance of resident agents, and does not
maintain a place of regular business in this State or a designated agent upon whom service
may be made upon causes of action arising out of such business done in this State, the act or
acts of engaging in such business within this State shall be deemed equivalent to an appointment by such foreign corporation... of the Secretary of State of Texas as agent upon whom
service of process may be made in any action, suit or proceedings arising out of such business done in this State, wherein such corporation ... is a party or is to be made a party.
Sec. 4. For the purpose of this Act, and without including other acts that may constitute
doing business, any foreign corporation ... shall be deemed doing business in this State by
entering into contract by mail or otherwise with a resident of Texas to be performed in whole
or in part by either party in this State, or the committing of any tort in whole or in part in
this State. The act of recruiting Texas residents, directly or through an intermediary located in
Texas, for employment inside or outside of Texas shall be deemed doing business in this
State.
Id., quoted in Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 413 n.7.
114. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)).
115. Id.at 415.
116. lId at 414.
117. Il at 414-15 (discussing Perkins v. Bengnet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952),
and Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779-80 (1984)).
118. See id.

119. See id. at 418-19.
120. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
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transnational relationships, but is nonetheless instructive. A federal district court in Florida claimed personal jurisdiction over a Michigan resident under a Florida statute providing for jurisdiction of a nonresident
who "[b]reach[es] a contract in this state."' 2' The Michigan resident had
entered a franchise agreement and then failed to pay franchise fees
which, by contract, were due in Florida.122 The franchise contract provided that the franchise relationship was established in Miami and governed by Florida law.'2
Given the consent evidenced in the franchise contract, Justice Brennan's majority opinion refused to allow use of the Due Process Clause as
a "territorial shield to avoid interstate obligations that have been voluntarily assumed."' 124 The fact that the franchisee "did not physically enter
the forum State," did not prevent the exercise of jurisdiction:
Although territorial presence frequently will enhance a potential defendant's affiliation with a State and reinforce the reasonable foreseeability of suit there, it is an
inescapable fact of modem commercial life that a substantial amount of business is
transacted solely by mail and wire communications across state lines, thus obviating the need for physical presence within a State in which business is conducted.
So long as a commercial actor's efforts are "purposefully directed" toward residents of another State, we have consistently rejected the notion that an absence of
physical contacts can defeat personal jurisdiction there. 1zn

Once it is shown that a defendant has purposefully established contacts
with the forum state-here through agreement to the characterization of
its conduct in contract clauses-"these contacts may be considered in
light of other factors to determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with 'fair play and substantial justice.' "126 Ultimately, even though the franchisee had no physical ties to Florida other
than sending a colleague to a brief training course, did not maintain offices in Florida, and had never visited there, the dispute grew out of " 'a
contract which had a substantial connection with that State,' " including
"a carefully structured 20-year relationship that envisioned continuing
127
and wide-reaching contacts with Burger King in Florida."'
The most recent significant case in the U.S. Supreme Court is transnational in its facts, and offers both guidance and confusion. Asahi Metal
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

1L at 463-64 (quoting FLA. STAT. ch. 48.193(l)(g) (Supp. 1984)).
See id. at 464.
See id.at 465-66.
Id. at 474.
Id. at 476 (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 476 (1984)).
Id. (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945)).
Id. at 479-80 (quoting McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957)).
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Industry Co. v. Superior Court,1 28 brought two four-justice plurality opinions, taking divergent positions on the "stream of commerce" language
of World-Wide Volkswagen. Asahi, a Japanese manufacturer of valve
stems, sold them to Cheng Shin, a Taiwanese tire manufacturer, who
used them as components in tire tubes, including one that ultimately was
incorporated into a motorcycle sold and used in California. 129 When the
driver of the motorcycle was injured in an accident, and his passenger
killed, the driver brought a products liability claim in California. 130 All
defendants other than Asahi settled with the plaintiff, and the only issue
13
remaining was the liability of Asahi to Cheng Shin for contribution. '
Asahi had not been an original defendant, but had been impleaded by
32
Cheng Shin.
California's long-arm statute authorized the exercise of jurisdiction
"on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of
the United States."' 33 After reciting the usual language about the Due
Process Clause limiting the assertion of jurisdiction, Justice O'Connor's
plurality opinion adopted a "stream of commerce plus" approach. 34 Reflective of the World-Wide Volkswagen holding that a consumer's unilateral action in bringing a product into a jurisdiction would be insufficient
to support jurisdiction, Justice O'Connor stated that the mere insertion of
a product into the stream of commerce, absent some purposeful act availing the defendant of the benefits of the jurisdiction, also should not support constitutional jurisdiction:
The "substantial connection" between the defendant and the forum State necessary
for a finding of minimum contacts must come about by an action of the defendant
purposefully directed toward the forum State. The placement of a product into the
stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State .... [A] defendant's awareness that the stream of
commerce may or will sweep the product into the forum State does not convert the
mere act of placing the product into the stream into an act purposefully directed toward the forum State. 35

Ultimately, Justice O'Connor determined that it was unreasonable to assert jurisdiction over the Japanese defendant simply for purposes of de128.
129.
130.
131.

480 U.S. 102 (1987).
See id.at 106.
See id. at 105-06.
See id. at 106.

132.
133.
134.
135.

See id.
CAL CIv. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973).
See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 111-12 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.).
Id. at 112 (citations omitted).
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ciding what was now a dispute only with a Taiwanese party. 13 6 The reasonableness analysis was accomplished in a review of the five-factor test
of World-Wide Volkswagen:
A court must consider the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum
State, and the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief. It must also weigh in its determination "the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient
resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies."' 37

Justice Brennan's concurrence, joined by Justices White, Marshall and
Blackmun, would have accepted a simple stream of commerce test, 38 and
39
found jurisdiction to exist.1
C. Making Sense of the Semantics of Due Process Analysis
To a lawyer from a civil law system, accustomed to the relative
structure of code-type lists of jurisdictional rules, and reasoning from
general principles often more certain than the concept of due process,
this trip through U.S. case law must seem rather confusing. Ultimately,
however, whether the language used is "minimum contacts," "purposeful
availment," "stream of commerce," or any other, the test focuses on two
elements: (1) whether there is a sufficient nexus between the defendant
and the forum state, and (2) whether the circumstances make it fair and
40
reasonable to exercise jurisdiction.1
136. See id. at 116 ("Considering the international context, the heavy burden on the alien
defendant, and the slight interests of the plaintiff and the forum State, the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a California court over Asahi in this instance would be unreasonable and unfair.").

137. Id. at 113 (quoting World-wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292
(1980)).
138.
The stream of commerce refers not to unpredictable currents or eddies, but to the regular and
anticipated flow of products from manufacture to distribution to retail sale. As long as a participant in this process is aware that the final product is being marketed in the forum State,
the possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come as a surprise.
Id.at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring).
139. See id. at 116. while some have suggested a national contacts analysis (rather than reliance only on the contacts with the single U.S. state in which the action is brought), Justice
O'Connor specifically avoided addressing this issue:
We have no occasion here to determine whether Congress could, consistent with the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, authorize federal court personal jurisdiction over
alien defendants based on the aggregate of national contacts, rather than on the contacts between the defendant and the State in which the federal court sits.
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113 n.* (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.).
140. Helicopteros indicates the possibility of a third element, superimposed on these two: the
connection between the in-state activities and the cause of action. See Helicopteros Nacionales de
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If we look at results, rather than only at language, the picture is
somewhat simpler (at least if we look only at the Supreme Court decisions). Few now argue that the conditions in World-Wide Volkswagen
should have resulted in a finding of jurisdiction. The distributor and retailer had no connection with Oklahoma other than the fortuitous trip by
one of their customers through that state. While it may have been foreseeable that some purchaser of a car in New York would drive to
Oklahoma, that is not the foreseeability required under due process analysis. This was not enough to make it foreseeable that a New York dealer
or wholesaler would be haled into court there. Nor did it involve a
stream of commerce initiated by and beneficial to the defendants.
Similarly, the number of sales persons and level of sales by a Missouri-based company in Washington lend credence to the reasonableness
of jurisdiction in InternationalShoe. In Asahi, on the other hand (leaving
aside the divergent opinions on a "stream of commerce" analysis), it
seems reasonable for a U.S. court not to take jurisdiction over a dispute
that remains only between Taiwanese and Japanese parties, especially
when the product of the Taiwanese party had reached California only as
an indirect result of the commercial chain of manufacture and
141
distribution.
Helicopteros may be the more difficult case. The Peruvian corporation there had a number of contacts with the state of Texas, and even
though the cause of action on an accident in Peru did not arise directly
out of those contacts, there was at least an indirect relationship between
the purchase of helicopters in Texas, the training of pilots there, and a
crash involving those helicopters and those pilots. Helicopteros demonstrates that the Due Process Clause remains a constitutional limitation on
the exercise of jurisdiction by U.S. courts. It also illustrates how the conColombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984). A nexus that might be sufficient if the cause of
action was closely connected to the in-state activities might not be enough if the cause of action was
unrelated. See id. at 414-15. Thus, "[w]hen a controversy is related to or 'arises out of' a defendant's contacts with the forum, the Court has said that a 'relationship among the defendant, the forum,
and the litigation' is the essential foundation of in personam jurisdiction." Id. at 414 (citing Shaffer
v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)). Helicopteros was the first case in which the Supreme Court
adopted the distinction between "general jurisdiction," based on the systematic and continuous activities of the defendant in the forum state, and "specific jurisdiction," based on lesser activities in the
forum state but requiring that the cause of action have a direct connection with those activities. See
supra text accompanying notes 112-16.
141. But see Linda J. Silberman, Judicial Jurisdiction in the Conflict of Laws Course: Adding
a Comparative Dimension, 28 VND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 389, 401 (1995) ("If the facts of Asahi arose
within the framework of the Brussels Convention, the outcome would be different from that reached
by the U.S. Supreme Court.").
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cept of general jurisdiction serves to limit the jurisdictional reach of
courts in the due process analysis. Thus, when the activity sued upon
does not arise out of the "minimum contacts" that exist, something more
than the threshold of activity required for specific jurisdiction must be
met. 42 The activity threshold is raised to the "systematic and continuous" level, which has proved more difficult to satisfy. While Asahi creates difficulty in determining the current application of a "stream of
commerce" test, it does combine with Helicopteros to indicate that the
U.S. Supreme Court will not let a foreign corporation be sued in a state
where it has limited activity unless there exists a close connection between the cause of action and the activity. This should reduce significantly the likelihood that jurisdiction can be successfully asserted on
claims arising or localized elsewhere.
I1. DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS AND JURISDICTION UNDER THE BRUSSELS
CONVENTION

While the discussion above sets the framework for analysis of particular bases of jurisdiction that may be included in a Hague jurisdiction
and judgments convention, it is useful to provide specific examples of
bases of jurisdiction that would and would not be constitutionally acceptable in the United States. The following discussion considers two specific
provisions of the Brussels Convention, as well as national jurisdictional
rules excluded from application by Article 3 thereof, as illustrations in
determining the type of provisions that would withstand constitutional
challenge in the United States.
A. Article 5(1) ContractJurisdiction
Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention provides the following rule
for specific jurisdiction in contract cases:
142. Courts applying specific jurisdiction frequently move away from the "contacts" semantics, applying a tripartite test:
(1) The defendant must have done some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the
privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections
of its laws; (2) the claim must arise out of the defendant's forum-related activities; and
(3) the exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. National Bank of Coop., 103 F.3d 888, 894 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting
Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 E2d 377, 381 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 499 U.S.
585 (1991)). Other Circuits apply a similar test. See, e.g., Nowak v. Tak How Invs., Ltd., 94 F.3d
708, 712-13 (lst Cir. 1996); Compuserve, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1263-68 (6th Cir. 1996).
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A person domiciled in a Contracting State may, in another Contracting State, be
sued:
(1) in matters relating to a contract, in the courts for the place of performance
of the obligation in question; .... 143

The European Court of Justice has ruled that it is for the court before
which the matter is brought to (1) apply its rules of private international
law to determine the law applicable to the contract, and (2) then apply
that law to determine the place of performance of the contractual obligation. 144 When such an interpretation is applied to contracts for goods and
services ranging from the manufacture and delivery of ski suits 45 to the
provision of architectural services, 146 the combinations and permutations
for jurisdictional locus become almost endless. Not only does such an interpretation begin by using choice of law to determine jurisdiction (a process not always satisfactory), but it acknowledges that a single contract
may involve multiple obligations and that the parties must walt until suit
is brought to determine which of those obligations is most important:
The place in which that obligation is to be performed usually constitutes the closest
connecting factor between the dispute and the court having jurisdiction over it, and
it is this connecting factor which explains why, in contractual matters, it is the
court of the place of performance of the obligation which has jurisdiction.
Admittedly, the above rule does not afford a solution in the particular case of
a dispute concerned with a number of obligations arising under the same contract
and forming the basis of the proceedings commenced by the plaintiff. However, in
such a case the court before which the matter is brought will, when determining
whether it has jurisdiction, be guided by the maxim accessorium sequitur
principale; in other words, where various obligations are at issue, it will be the
principal obligation which will determine its jurisdiction....
...[Flor the purposes of determining the place of performance within the
meaning of Article 5(1) of the Convention, the obligation to be taken into consideration in a dispute concerning proceedings for the recovery of fees commenced by
an architect commissioned to draw up plans for the building of houses is the contractual obligation which forms the actual basis of the legal proceedings. 147

It is not difficult to hypothesize a contract that might result in jurisdiction under such a rule that would run afoul of the Due Process Clause.
For example, assume a seller from state A and a buyer from state B
143. Brussels Convention, supra note 28, art. 5(1).
144. See Case 12/76, Industrie Tessili Italiana Como v. Dunlop AG, 1976 E.C.R. 1473, 1486.
145. See id (involving a claim of defective product involving a contract between Italian seller
and German buyer for the delivery of women's ski suits).
146. See, e.g., Case 266/85, Shenavai v. Kreischer, 1987 E.C.R. 239 (concerning a suit by a
German architect against a Dutch client for recovery of fees for the preparation of plans for the construction of holiday homes in Germany).
147. Id at 256.
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spend substantial time in state B negotiating a contract for the delivery of
goods to the buyer in state B. Assume also that the goods are acquired
by the seller in State C, with delivery arranged to state B, and that the
buyer has never been present in state A. Assume finally that delivery is
made and the buyer refuses to make payment. Upon suit brought for payment by the seller in a state A court, if state A's rule of private international law (conflicts of law) results in a finding that the payment obligation (the principal obligation at issue) is to be performed at the seller's
place of business (in state A), then state A law governs the obligation,
and Article 5(1) places jurisdiction in the courts of state A. The focus on
the nexus between the claim and the court, rather than on the nexus between the defendant and the court, would lead to jurisdiction likely in violation of the Due Process Clause under U.S. law. The many possibilities
for jurisdiction in states with minimal or no relationship to the defendant
under such a rule create obvious problems for U.S. agreement to such a
provision in a multilateral treaty on jurisdiction and the recognition and
enforcement of judgments.
A first look at state long-arm statutes in the United States may lead
one to ask why the United States should have problems with such a provision. Long-arm statutes in the various U.S. states provide a number of
formulations of the basic rule of contract jurisdiction-many of which
look quite like Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention. Both the New
York and Pennsylvania statutes encompass jurisdiction over contract
claims through "transacting business" language and include a specific
clause catching defendants that contract "anywhere to supply goods or
services in the state."' 148 Some statutes have permitted jurisdiction based
on the place where the contract was made. 149 Others look to the place
where the contract is to be performed. 50 Neither of these tests is wholly
satisfactory. Determining where a contract was made is not always an
easy task. Some courts look to the final act necessary to create a binding
contract, holding that for jurisdictional purposes the place of acceptance
148. N.Y. C.P.L.R 302(a)(1) (McKinney 1990). See also 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5322(a)(1
& 2) (Vest 1981).
149. An example is the former North Carolina statute providing for jurisdiction over foreign
corporation in matters arising out of "any contract made in this State or to be performed in this
State." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-145, as applied in Bowman v. Curt G. Joa, Inc., 361 F2d 706, 712 (4th
Cir. 1966).
150. See 42 IoWA CODE ANN. § 617.3 (West Supp. 1998); TEx. Civ. PRAc.& Rmf. CODE ANN.
§ 17.042 (vest 1997); UNit. INrERsTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE Acr § 1.03(a)(2), 13 U.LA.
357, 362 (1986).
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is the place at which a contract is made. 51 Thus, even repeated negotiations within the state would not provide jurisdiction if the contract were
finally signed in another state. Similar problems arise in determining how
52
substantial the "performance" element must be to support jurisdiction.1
If the long-arm statute contains no specific provision creating jurisdiction where the contract is made, under a "transacting business" provision the mere execution of a contract in the forum state is unlikely to
suffice to create jurisdiction. 5 Even if it is enough under the long-arm
statute, courts have ruled that "merely entering into a contract" in a
state, or with a resident of the state, will not be enough, without more, to
establish the minimum contacts necessary to Fourteenth Amendment due
process analysis. 154 Thus, "an out-of-state party's contract with an in-state
155
party is alone not enough to establish the requisite minimum contacts,"'
and " 'prior negotiations and contemplated future consequences, along
with the terms of the contract and the parties' actual course of dealing'
must indicate the purposeful availment that makes litigating in the forum
156
state foreseeable to the defendant."'
The due process portion of the analysis in contract cases in U.S.
courts is generally parallel to the analysis in tort cases. Courts use the
analytical framework set forth above interchangeably, regardless of the
cause of action. Analysis of the due process requirement in contract cases
often parallels the general three-part analysis used by many courts to find
(1) purposeful availment on the part of the defendant of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum and the protections of the laws of
the forum, (2) a claim that arises out of those purposeful activities, and
(3) reasonableness in the exercise of jurisdiction. 5 7 Thus, in Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 58 Justice Brennan focused on a series of contractual
relations with a Florida corporation, including clauses stating that the
subject franchise relationship was to be "established" in Florida and
governed by Florida law, to find that the defendant had "purposefully es151. See, e.g., Byham v. National Cibo House Corp., 143 S.E.2d 225, 233 (1965).
152. See, e.g., Bowman v. Curt G. Joa, Inc., 361 F.2d 706, 715 (4th Cir. 1966) (requiring
"substantial" performance within the state).
153. See, e.g., Aurea Jewelry Creations, Inc. v. Lissona, 344 F. Supp. 179, 181 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
154. Compuserve, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 .3d 1257, 1265 (6th Cir. 1996).
155. RAR, Inc. v. Turner Diesel, Ltd., 107 F.3d 1272, 1277 (7th Cir. 1997).
156. Id. (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 479 (1985)).
157. See supra note 142. This tripartite analysis was applied to a contract action in Reynolds
v. International Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 23 F.3d 1110, 1116 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S.
962 (1994).
158. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
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tablished 'minimum contacts' in the forum State." 15 9 After finding such
contacts to exist, the inquiry shifted to whether assertion of jurisdiction
over the out-of-state defendant would comport with notions of "fair play
and substantial justice."' 160 The claim there specifically arose out of the
contract relationship.
Satisfaction of the due process analysis in a contract case requires
that the connections with the forum be substantial enough that the
defendant "should reasonably [have] anticipate[d] being haled into" the
forum court.' 6' Thus, where the defendant's contacts with the plaintiff in
the forum state are merely "superficial," and the parties have engaged in
no prior negotiations there and expected no future consequences there,
even though mail and telephone communications have taken place, due
process will not be satisfied in a contract case. 162
B. Article 5(3) Tort Jurisdiction
Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention provides the following rule
for specific jurisdiction in tort cases:
A person domiciled in a Contracting State may, in another Contracting State, be
sued:
(3) in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the courts for the place
where the harmful event occurred. 163

The seminal case on the interpretation of Article 5(3) is Handelskwekerij
G.J. Bier B.V v. Mines de Potasse d'Alsace S.A.' 64 A Dutch horticultural
business and the Reinwater Foundation sued a French defendant in the
court of first instance at Rotterdam1 65 The claim was that the French
concern had polluted the waters of the Rhine by the discharge of saline
waste from its operations in France, and thus damaged the plaintiff's business (which relied on irrigation from the Rhine river), and forced expensive measures to prevent further damage. 166 When the Rotterdam court
held it had no jurisdiction, and the case was appealed to the Gerechtshof
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 474.
Id. at 476 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 362 U.S. 310, 320 (1945)).
Compuserve, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1256, 1263 (6th Cir. 1996).
See Reynolds, 23 E3d at 1118-1121.
Brussels Convention, supra note 28, art. 5(3).
Case 21176, 1976 E.C.R. 1735.
See id. at 1736-37.
See id. at 1744.
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in The Hague, that court referred to the European Court of Justice the
following question:
'Are the words "the place where the harmful event occurred," appearing in the
text of Article 5 (3) ... to be understood as meaning "the place where the damage
occurred (the place where the damage took place or became apparent)" or rather
"the place where the event having the damage as its sequel occurred (the place
where the act was or was not performed)"?'1 67

Unlike the U.S. due process focus on contacts between the defendant and the court asserting jurisdiction, the Bier court looked for a "particularly close connecting factor between a dispute and the court which
may be called upon to hear it."1 68 The court found such a connecting
factor at the place where the damage is felt as well as at the place where
the event giving rise to the damage occurred. 169 Thus, the court held that,
in an action brought under Article 5(3), "the defendant may be sued, at
the option of the plaintiff, either in the courts for the place where the
damage occurred or in the courts for the place of the event which gives
rise to and is at the origin of that damage."' 7 0 This was an expansive
reading of Article 5(3), and in that sense it parallels the role of International Shoe in the United States. 171 However, Bier has not been followed
by a counterpart to World-Wide Volkswagen that reasserts limitations on
the expansive language of the opinion.
A clear example of the difference between the analysis in Bier and
U.S. due process analysis arises by applying the Bier analysis to the facts
in World-Wide Volkswagen. 72 Taking the Bier test literally, if U.S. states
operated under a Brussels Convention system rather than the Full Faith
and Credit and Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution, then a de167.

Id. at 1745.

168. Id. at 1746.
169. The court found either place to "constitute a significant connecting factor from the point
of view of jurisdiction." Id. at 1746.
170. Id. at 1749. One of the approaches to Article 5(3) not adopted was the assertion of the
Government of the Netherlands and the Commission that a choice of law analysis be applied to
questions of jurisdiction such that jurisdiction be available in the state with the "most significant relationship" with the harmful event. Id. at 1754 (Op. of Advocate General Capotorti). While the
court's opinion provided no need to refer directly to this argument, the opinion of Advocate General
Capotorti specifically rejected it on the basis that it was "not... in accordance with the objective of
the Brussels Convention... to simplify problems relating to determination of the national court having jurisdiction." Id. at 1755.
171. See supra notes 33-47 and accompanying text.
172. A similar analysis of the facts of Asahi indicates that countries such as Italy, England
and Japan would likely have assumed jurisdiction there where the U.S. Supreme Court found it inappropriate to do so under a due process analysis. See Silberman, supra note 141, at 401-02.
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fective automobile causing an accident and injury in Oklahoma could
lead to a case being brought (1) at the domicile of the defendant under
Article 2, (2) at the place where the automobile was manufactured (the
event giving rise to the damage) under Article 5(3), or (3) at the place of
the accident (the place where the damage occurred), all at the option of
the plaintiff.
Thus, the literal language of the Bier decision would allow jurisdiction in Oklahoma over the New York distributor and retailer. This application of Bier to the facts of World-Wide Volkswagen demonstrates the
jurisdiction-limiting function of the Due Process Clause. The clause operates to restrict the plaintiff's choice of forum, and thus to protect the
defendant. The post-Bier decisions of the European Court of Justice
demonstrate a similar defendant-protection element in the structure of the
Brussels Convention. 173 In those cases, the court develops a three-step
analysis that, on its face, provides defendants with protection from unreasonable assertions of jurisdiction. First, Article 2 of the Convention provides the general rule that jurisdiction exists in the state of domicile of
the defendant. Article 3 then explicitly protects Community defendants
from exorbitant, plaintiff-friendly jurisdictional bases otherwise available
in the Member States. Finally, all specific bases of jurisdiction are to be
restrictively construed, thus limiting the availability of other forums to a
plaintiff subject to the Convention, and "militat[ing] against any interpretation of the Convention which, otherwise than in the cases expressly
provided for, might lead to recognition of the jurisdiction of the courts of
the plaintiff's domicile and would enable a plaintiff to determine the
competent court by his choice of domicile." 1 74 Despite this statement by
the court of a restrictive approach to jurisdiction under the Convention,
the post-Bier cases provide no language that would help the defendant in
a World-Wide Volkswagen set of facts. Thus, tort jurisdiction under Brussels Article 5(3) (as currently interpreted) appears to be broader than
U.S. due process analysis would allow.
173. See, e.g., Case C-364/93, Marinari v. Lloyds Bank ple, 1995-1 E.C.R. 1-2719; Case C-68/
93, Shevill v. Presse Alliance SA, 1995-1 E.C.R. 1-415; Case C-220/88, Dumez France v. Hessisehe
Landesbank, 1990-1 E.C.R. 1-49; Case 189/87, Kalfelis v. Bankhaus Schr6der, 1988 E.C.R. 5565.
For a more detailed discussion of these cases, see Ronald A. Brand, Tort Jurisdiction in a Multilateral Convention: The Lessons of the Due Process Clause and the Brussels Convention, 24 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 125 (1998).
174. Case C-220/88, Dumez France v. Hessische Landesbank, 1990-1 E.C.R. 1-49, 1-80.
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C. Article 3 Exorbitant Jurisdiction Provisions of National Laws
Article 3, paragraph 2, of the Brussels Convention provides a nonexhaustive list from the laws of each of the Member States of specific
statutes that "shall not be applicable" in determining jurisdiction over
persons domiciled in a Contracting State. Thus, the Member States have
agreed that these provisions are not appropriate for use against defendants domiciled within their territories and some other basis of jurisdiction
must be available to bring such a defendant within the jurisdiction of the
court in question. A list making reference to specific statutory provisions
would be unsuited to a global convention, but the concept is applicable,
and thus requires that the types of bases of jurisdiction represented by
these statutes be considered and appropriately excluded through the use
of descriptive language. The following discussion considers the various
types of jurisdiction represented by the provisions listed in Article 3 of
the Brussels Convention.175
1.

Jurisdictionbased on the nationality of the plaintiff
Article 14 of the French Civil Code provides:

An alien, even not residing in France, may be summoned before the French courts
for the fulfillment of obligations contracted by him in France toward a French person; he may be brought before the French courts for obligations contracted by him
in a foreign country toward a French person. 176

Similar rules are provided in Article 14 of the Belgian Civil Code and
Article 14 of the Luxembourg Civil Code. 77 Such a basis of jurisdiction
would be impossible for the U.S. to agree to in a multilateral convention.
As indicated in the discussion above, in order for due process to be satis175. Except where specifically provided otherwise, the descriptions of the jurisdictional bases
listed in Article 3 contained in this discussion are taken from the following sources: Report by Mr. P.
Jenard on the Convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in
civil and commercial matters, 1979 O.J. (C59) 1, 19-20 [hereinafter Jenard Report]; Report by Professor Dr. Peter Schlosser on the Convention of 9 October 1978 on the Association of the Kingdom
of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters and to the
Protocol on its interpretation by the Court of Justice, 1979 O.J. (C59) 71, 99-100 [hereinafter
Schlosser Report]; GEORGES R. DELAmm, TRANSNATIONAL Co RA'crs: APPLIcABLE LAW AND SErrLErMiENT
OF Dispurras (1990); PETER KAYE, CIVIL JURISDIlCrON AND ENFORcEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGENrcrs 265-269 (1987).
176. See 2 DELAUME, supra note 175, at § 8.02, at 13.

177. A similar provision is found in Article 127 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the Netherlands, but has been rendered moot by a 1940 decision of the Dutch Supreme Court. See KAYE, supra
note 175, at 268.
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fled, there must be some nexus between the defendant and the jurisdiction asserting judicial authority over the defendant, and that nexus normally must result from the defendant's conduct. Any provision that
establishes jurisdiction based on the mere connection between the plaintiff and the state creates obvious possibilities for use in a manner that
would violate the due process rights of a defendant.
2. Jurisdiction based on the mere presence of property belonging to
the defendant
Article 23 of the German Code of Civil Procedure provides that,
For complaints asserting pecuniary claims against a person who has no domicile
within the country, the court of the district within which this person has property,
or within which is found the object claimed by the complaint, has jurisdiction. In
the case of claims the debtor's domicile is considered the place where the property
is located, and when
the claim is secured, the place where the security is located is
17
also so considered. 8

Article 248(2) of the Danish Law on Civil Procedure similarly provides
that a foreigner may be sued before any Danish court in whose district
he resides or has property on the date on which the action is commenced
by service of process, 79 and section 3(1) of chapter 10 of the Code of
Judicial Procedure of Sweden provides that, on debt obligations, "anyone
without a known residence within the realm may be sued at the place in
which property belonging to him is located." 180 Using nothing more than
the location of tangible property to obtain in personam jurisdiction over
the defendant would be unacceptable in the United States. The mere
presence of an item of property, no matter how limited in value, does not
create the sufficient nexus between the court and the defendant to assure
that due process rights will be protected. Nor does it necessarily indicate
conduct of the defendant creating a nexus.
The Article 3 list in the Brussels Convention also excludes application of United Kingdom rules "which enable jurisdiction to be founded
on: . . . (b) the presence within the United Kingdom of property belonging to the defendant; or (c) the seizure by the plaintiff of property situated in the United Kingdom."' 8'1 While in rem jurisdiction over the prop178. See Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 44, at 1141 n.48 (translation).
179. See KAYE, supra note 175, at 267.
180. THE SWEDISH CODE OF JuDIcIAL PROCEDURE 43 (rev. ed., Anders Bruzelius & Krister
Thelin eds., 1979).
181. Brussels Convention, supra note 28, art. 3.
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erty present or seized may be appropriate under a due process analysis,
jurisdiction over the defendant based on the mere presence of property
would be unacceptable.
3. Jurisdictionbased on the nationality of the defendant
Article 15 of the French Civil Code provides that "a French citizen
may be brought before a French court in respect of obligations contracted
by him in a foreign country, even toward an alien." 18 2 The same rule is
found in Article 15 of the Belgian Civil Code and Article 15 of the Civil
Code of Luxembourg. In today's mobile society, it is not uncommon to
find a citizen of a country who has not been in that country (other than
for short visits) for quite some time, and who has both residence and
domicile outside the country. Thus, it is possible that such a provision
could be used to obtain jurisdiction over a defendant who had no practical contacts with the forum state, thus appearing to violate due process
norms. 183 Case law in the United States indicates, however, that jurisdiction based on citizenship would not violate due process. In Blackmer v.
United States,184 the Supreme Court upheld the exercise of jurisdiction
over a U.S. citizen resident in Paris. Mr. Blackmer was held in contempt
of court for failure to respond to subpoenas, served upon him in France,
that required him to appear as a witness on behalf of the United States in
a criminal trial.1 5 A federal statute specifically required that citizens resident abroad appear as witnesses at a criminal trial, upon proper service
of a subpoena and a tender of travel expenses. 186 Citing earlier cases upholding legislative jurisdiction on the basis of citizenship, 8 7 the Court
stated:
182. 2 DELAutME, supra note 175, § 8.02, at 13.
183. This discussion assumes that such provisions apply only to natural persons. Thus, if citizenship of corporations is determined by the place of incorporation, it is logical to allow jurisdiction
in the state of incorporation as a result of the benefits obtained from the act of incorporation. This is
consistent with the diversity jurisdiction statute in U.S. federal district courts, which provides that,
for purposes of determining jurisdiction, "a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of any State
by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business ......
28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (1994).
184. 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
185. See id. at 433.
186.

See id. at 433-35.

187. See, e.g., Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924) (holding that the United States may assert jurisdiction over U.S. citizen resident in Mexico to tax income earned in Mexico); United States v.
Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922) (U.S. citizen resident abroad is subject to punishment in U.S. courts
for disobedience to U.S. laws through conduct abroad); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273 (1919)
(U.S. citizen summoned to give testimony before a grand jury in the United States).
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The jurisdiction of the United States over its absent citizen, so far as the binding
effect of its legislation is concerned, is a jurisdiction in personam, as he is personally bound to take notice of the laws that are applicable to him and to obey them.
But, for the exercise of judicial jurisdiction in personam, there must be due process, which requires appropriate notice of the judicial action and an opportunity to
be heard.188

Blackmer was pre-InternationalShoe and considers only notice and service in its due process analysis. It has, however, been followed in more
recent federal cases, and the emphasis on contacts between the defendant
and the forum state would not likely change the result in a case today.1t 9
The Restatement takes the position that "a state's exercise of jurisdiction
to adjudicate with respect to a person ... is reasonable if, at the time jurisdiction is asserted: . . . (d) the person, if a natural person, is a national
of the state." 190 Thus, placing jurisdiction based on the nationality of the
defendant on the prohibited bases list might actually cut back jurisdiction
currently available under a due process analysis in the United States.
4. Jurisdiction in disregard of a choice of forum clause betveen the
parties
Article 2 of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure provides that an
agreement to jurisdiction in a non-Italian court or arbitral tribunal will be
valid only if it is between aliens or between an alien and an Italian citizen who has neither residence nor domicile in Italy. This creates obvious
problems alongside Article 17 of the Brussels Convention, which respects
the parties' choice of forum for jurisdictional purposes. 191 It is thus logical to exclude the application of such a provision in a Brussels-type convention. A similar prorogation provision in a Hague convention would
188. Blaclaner, 284 U.S. at 438 (citation omitted).
189. See, e.g., Bulova Watch Co. v. Steele, 194 F.2d 567, 571 (5th Cir. 1952) ("For the
United States to exercise its jurisdiction over one of its own nationals involves no conflict with the
sovereignty of the Republic of Mexico."). On certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, this case was
treated more as one of prescriptive jurisdiction, with the focus on whether Congress intended the
reach of legislation to extend beyond U.S. borders. See Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280,
285 (1952). A similar focus on prescriptive jurisdiction in citing Blacklner is found in Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 922 (1984).
190. RESTATEMENT (TrURD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 421(2)(d)
(1987).
191. The general rule of Article 17 is that
[i]f the parties, one or more of whom is domiciled in a Contracting State, have agreed that a
court or the courts of a Contracting State are to have jurisdiction to settle any disputes which
have arisen or which may arise in connection with a particular legal relationship, that court or
those courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction.
Brussels Convention, supra note 28, art. 17.
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(and is likely to) avoid the need to consider whether a provision of the
Italian type is consistent with U.S. due process jurisprudence. Early doctrine in the United States held that "agreements in advance to oust the
courts of the jurisdiction conferred by law are illegal and void."' 92 The
leading case now is The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.19 Bremen did
not involve a due process analysis per se, but applied a strong presumption in favor of the enforcement of choice of forum clauses in transnational transactions. 194 On its facts, it applied only to admiralty law, but its
rationale has been extended to other areas of law.195 The Restatement
notes that
courts in recent years have rarely taken jurisdiction over cases in which a different
forum was chosen by the parties, except in situations where the chosen forum had
undergone a major revolution or comparable political change, casting doubt on the
continuing existence196of the forum intended and on the opportunity of a party to secure a fair hearing.

Thus, while due process may not require respect for the parties' choice
of forum, a Hague Convention provision respecting prorogation agreements between parties to litigation will not present a constitutional problem for the United States.
5. Jurisdiction based on the place of contracting or the place of performance of a contract
Article 4(2) of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure authorizes jurisdiction based on the place of contracting or place of performance of the
contract. It was necessary to place such a provision in the exorbitant jurisdiction list of Article 3 of the Brussels Convention because of its divergence from the specific jurisdiction contract rules in Article 5(1). As
indicated above, 197 long-arm statutes in some U.S. states have language
192. Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 451 (1874).
193. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
194. See id.at 17-20.
195. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631
(1985); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974). Most recently, the 9th Circuit upheld the
choice of law and choice of forum clauses in the standard Lloyd's "Name" contract-which provides for English law to be applied in English courts to any dispute arising out of membership-against allegations that it violated the anti-waiver provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See Richards v. Lloyd's of London, 135 F3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1998)
(en banc decision withdrawing earlier decision at 107 F.3d 1422 (9th Cir. 1997)).
196. RFSTATEENT (THiRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 421 reporters'
note 6, at 311-12 (1987).
197. See supra notes 148-56 and accompanying text.
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similar to the Italian provision. At the same time, however, the United
States could not agree to a provision in a multilateral treaty that requires
the availability of such jurisdiction. It is possible that an extension of jurisdiction may fall within the applicable long-arm statute but at the same
time violate the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. 198 While the
U.S. Constitution will always override a state statute in domestic law, the
relationship between a treaty and domestic law (particularly federal law)
will not always create so clear a result. 199 Thus, such a provision in a
multilateral treaty would be unacceptable.
6. Jurisdiction based on service during temporary presence in the forum state
"Tag jurisdiction," based solely on service of process on the
defendant during his or her temporary presence in the forum state, is
available under the rules of jurisdiction in both the United Kingdom and
Ireland. 2°° Under Article 3 of the Brussels Convention, however, it is not
available against persons domiciled in EU Member States. In the United
States, the focus on territorial power of the state, as demonstrated by
Pennoyer v. Neff,201 supports jurisdiction based on even temporary presence of the defendant in the state. This comports with Anglo-American
common law traditions. Most recently, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed
the exercise of jurisdiction by a California court over a New Jersey
defendant served in a divorce proceeding while he was on a trip to California to conduct business and visit his children who lived with their
mother in California. 20 Thus, tag jurisdiction remains alive in the United
States and has been found by the Supreme Court not to violate due process protections.
IV.

DUE PROCESS LIMITATIONS ON THE WORK OF THE HAGUE
CONFERENCE ON PRvATE INTERNATIONAL LAW

As the above discussion indicates, U.S. objections to certain jurisdictional bases in a Hague Convention will many times not represent a
198. See, e.g., Chaiken v. VV Publishing Corp., 119 F3d 1018 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that
even though the Massachusetts long-arm statute permitted jurisdiction, the limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause did not), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1169 (1998).
199. See infra notes 202-03 and accompanying text.
200. See Schlosser Report, supra note 175, at 100 (noting that this jurisdictional basis is rarely
used in Scotland, where the courts usually require presence for at least forty days, or the presence of
property (in addition to service within Scotland) as an accompanying condition).
201. See supra note 18.
202. See Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
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judgment that a given basis is "wrong" or "bad," but rather a determination that the Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution protect a
defendant from being subject to such a basis of jurisdiction. In this regard, the negotiators for the United States have no discretion. Unlike
other countries, in which jurisdiction is a statutory matter dependent upon
the bases listed in a code of civil procedure, in the United States, jurisdiction is a constitutional issue. While a statute may be amended by
treaty (or implementing legislation may incorporate appropriate statutory
amendments), 2 3 the U.S. Constitution is the supreme law within the U.S.
24
legal system and is not subject to change by treaty or statute. 0
It is also important to understand that the Due Process Clauses do
not require the assumption of jurisdiction in all instances in which a
defendant's due process rights would not be offended. They only prohibit
the exercise of jurisdiction when those rights would be offended. Thus,
while it is not possible for the United States to agree to provisiofs that
would go beyond the protections of due process, this does not mean that
the United States must agree only to provisions that go to the limits of
due process. In other words, the United States can agree to limitations on
jurisdiction within (but not in excess of) the due process limits. While a
treaty may not offend the U.S. Constitution, it may establish rules that
will result in changes that will limit the exercise of state and federal statutes (i.e., it cannot expand jurisdiction beyond due process limits, but it
can restrict the exercise of jurisdiction where due process is not being
denied).
203. The U.S. Constitution provides that treaties, and "Laws ... made in Pursuance" of the
Constitution, "shall be the supreme Law of the Land." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. It has long been
recognized that Congress may enact a statute superseding a prior treaty. See Taylor v. Morton, 23 F.
Cas. 784 (C.C.D. Mass. 1855) (No. 13,799), aff'd on other grounds, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 481 (1862).
Although it is difficult to find cases explicitly holding that a treaty may displace a prior act of Congress, Supreme Court dicta clearly indicate this to be so. See, e.g., The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S.
(11 Wall.) 616, 620-21 (1870).
The effect of treaties and acts of Congress, when in conflict, is not settled by the Constitution. But the question is not involved in any doubt as to its proper solution. A treaty may supersede a prior act of Congress, and an act of Congress may supersede a prior treaty.
Id. at 621 (footnotes omitted).
204. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957).
[No agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any other
branch of Government, which is free from the restraints of the Constitution....
The prohibitions of the Constitution were designed to apply to all branches of the
National Government and they cannot be nullified by the Executive or by the Executive and
the Senate combined.
Id.; see also Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAms AND THE UNrmED STATES CONST1TUTON 185-189 (2d ed.

1996).
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A. First Summary and Conclusions: Limitations on the United States as
a Result of the Due Process Clauses in the U.S. Constitution
Analysis of in personam jurisdiction by a U.S. court is a two-step
process. First the court determines whether there is jurisdiction under the.
appropriate long-arm statute. Next, if there is such jurisdiction, the court
determines whether the exercise of that jurisdiction in the particular case
is within the limits of due process (i.e., whether it affects the defendant
in a manner that denies due process rights).
It is not a problem in the U.S. constitutional structure to have in existence state long-arm statutes that might authorize jurisdiction beyond
the limits of the Due Process Clause. In any case in which the statute is
applied, the second-step due process analysis will limit the exercise of jurisdiction in order to prevent the statute's application in a manner that
would violate due process. The language of most long-arm statutes is not
the language of due process analysis. It is language similar to the specific jurisdictional provisions of the Brussels Convention. While Brussels
Convention-type language in a state long-arm statute is tolerable because
it can be negated through due process analysis in the courts, it would be
a different matter to have the same language in a multilateral treaty to
which the U.S. is a party. This results from the dualist nature of the U.S.
legal system in regard to international law.20 5 Having such language in a
jurisdiction and judgments treaty applicable in the United States would
create (at least) two problems:
1) First, if jurisdiction existed under the treaty, but a second-step
due process analysis would determine that the exercise of such jurisdiction was constitutionally impermissible, then there would be divergence
205. See, e.g., Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 E2d 929 (D.C.
Cir. 1988).
As the Supreme Court said in the Head Money Cases, a treaty "depends for the enforcement
of its provisions on the interest and honor of the governments which are parties to it. If these
fail, its infraction becomes the subject of international negotiations and reclamations... [but]
with all this the judicial courts have nothing to do and can give no redress." . . . This conclusion reflects the United States' adoption of a partly "dualist"-rather than strictly "monist"-view of international and domestic law. "[D]ualists view international law as a discrete
legal system [which] ... operates wholly on an inter-nation plane." . . .
It is uncertain whether either our republican form of government or our constitution's
supremacy clause requires this subordination of treaties to inconsistent domestic statutes....
Nevertheless, the "[Supreme] Court's jurisprudence about treaties inevitably reflects certain
assumptions about the relation between international law and United States law.... . . .
Given that dualist jurisprudence, we cannot find-as a matter of domestic law-that congressional enactments violate prior treaties.
Il at 937 (citations omitted).
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between the domestic law result and U.S. treaty obligations. Further,
such a result might confuse the ability of the parties to find a non-U.S.
court in which jurisdiction was appropriate (particularly if the applicable
basis of jurisdiction under the convention was exclusive).
2) The second problem relates to the treaty obligation to recognize
and enforce judgments from foreign courts based on acceptable bases of
jurisdiction as provided in the treaty. If a non-U.S. court was to take jurisdiction over a defendant pursuant to a Brussels-type provision (even
one that might be found in a long-arm statute in a U.S. state) that allowed for the possibility of jurisdiction in violation of the due process
rights of the defendant, and the resulting judgment was brought to the
U.S. for recognition, then the U.S. court might be required to recognize
the judgment under international law (i.e., the treaty), but prohibited from
recognizing the judgment under the U.S. Constitution.20 6 The Constitution
would prevail, again leaving the United States in breach of its treaty
obligations.
Thus, the United States cannot become a party to a multilateral
treaty with jurisdictional provisions that might allow the exercise of jurisdiction beyond the limits of due process. This necessarily sets up much
more difficult drafting problems for the treaty negotiators than for legislators in U.S. states who are drafting a long-arm statute. While this may
seem ironic, it is what we have to live with.
206. Whether all due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment are applicable to aliens
in the same manner as to citizens is not entirely clear. The following is a representative discussion of
this topic found in a case considering the application of the Wisconsin long-arm statute to a Greek
defendant:
[The plaintiff] does not argue that [the defendant], as an alien, has fewer rights to challenge
the long-arm statute than a nonresident American firm would have. Countless cases assume
that foreign companies have all the rights of U.S. citizens to object to extraterritorial assertions of personal jurisdiction.. . . The assumption has never to our knowledge actually been
examined, but it probably is too solidly entrenched to be questioned at this late date ....
Afram Export Corp. v. Metallurgiki Hayps, S.A., 772 F.2d 1358, 1362 (7th Cir. 1985) (citations
omitted). Whether a U.S. court, in recognition proceedings dealing with a foreign judgment, could
analyze jurisdiction in the foreign court's original proceedings in a manner other than through a due
process analysis is not clear. Most cases to date have very clearly applied the due process analysis of
InternationalShoe and its progeny to determine whether the foreign court whose judgment is being
presented had in personam jurisdiction over the defendant for recognition purposes. See RONALD A.
BRAND, ENFORCING FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND UNITED STATES JUDGMENTS
ABROAD 13-15 (1992). No clear example seems to exist of a claim that such a judgment against a
foreign defendant should receive any less probing an analysis than if it were against a U.S. citizen or
corporate national.
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B. Second Summary and Conclusions: Limitations on Other States as a
Result of the Due Process Clauses in the U.S. Constitution
Some of the specific bases of jurisdiction contained in the Brussels
and Lugano Conventions, as well as others found in the various applicable codes of potential contracting states, make a violation of U.S. concepts of due process possible (even if not probable) in cases brought
under these provisions. It may be that due process rights of the defendant
will be satisfied in the vast majority of cases brought under such provisions, and that U.S. recognition of the resulting judgments is possible
now under a non-treaty procedure. The mere possibility of a due process
violation, however, is sufficient to prevent the United States from being
constitutionally able to be a party to a convention that would allow the
continued exercise of such jurisdiction if there is an obligation under the
treaty to recognize the resulting judgment.
The problem faced by the United States in the Hague negotiations
creates a corresponding problem for other states involved. An example of
this problem is provided by the analysis of Article 5(3) of the Brussels
Convention above.20 7 As that analysis indicates, U.S. agreement to include such a provision in a convention as a required basis would set up
possible due process violations in the exercise of jurisdiction in U.S.
courts and in the recognition of judgments resulting from such jurisdiction exercised by foreign courts. At the same time, however, Brussels
Convention states may wish to retain such a jurisdictional basis (and
other jurisdictional bases that would create similar due process problems
for the United States) in the Brussels Convention, or at least in their national laws.
Only three options have been offered for dealing with bases of jurisdiction that create this problem. They are:
(1) a Hague Convention in which such a basis of jurisdiction is a required basis (i.e., a basis upon which assumption of jurisdiction by a national court is allowed under the convention);
(2) a Hague Convention in which such a basis of jurisdiction is a
prohibited basis (i.e., a basis upon which assumption of jurisdiction by a
national court is not allowed); or
(3) a Hague Convention in which such a basis of jurisdiction is a
permitted basis (i.e., a basis upon which assumption of jurisdiction by a
national court is allowed, but to which the obligation of recognition does
not attach, and recognition is possible under non-convention rules).
207.

See supra notes 163-73 and accompanying text.
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As the discussion in this paper demonstrates, the United States could not
be a party to a convention under the first option, but could be a party to
a convention resulting from the second or third option. Brussels Convention states, and other states wanting to retain a basis of jurisdiction that
creates due process concerns for the United States, will want to avoid the
second option. Thus, a convention carrying out the third option appears
to be the only mutually acceptable approach. The only alternative proposed to date that would allow such permitted bases of jurisdiction for
which there is no mandatory obligation of recognition in other contracting states is the mixed convention. 2 8

208. For a complete description of, and discussion of the rationale for, a mixed convention,
see Arthur T. Von Mehren, Enforcing Judgments Abroad: Reflections on the Design of Recognition
Conventions, 24 BRoOK. J. IhT'L L. 17 (1998).
A mixed convention is a hybrid form of the traditional "single" and "double" conventions.
Single conventions, like the earlier Hague Conventions, deal only with indirect jurisdiction and apply
only to the decision of the court asked to enforce a foreign judgment-thus, jurisdiction of the court
issuing a judgment is considered "indirectly" by the second court in deciding whether to recognize
the judgment of the issuing court. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters and Supplementary Protocol, Feb. 1, 1971, 1144
U.N.T.S. 249, reprinted in 15 AM. J. CoMp. L. 362 (1967); Convention on the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations, June 1, 1970, 978 U.N.T.S. 393, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 31. Double conventions, like Brussels and Lugano, provide direct jurisdiction rules applicable in the court in which
the case is first brought-thus addressing the matter from the outset and preempting the need for indirect consideration of the issuing court's jurisdiction by the court asked to recognize the resulting
judgment.
Under the mixed convention approach, there would exist a list of required bases of jurisdiction
and a list of prohibited bases of jurisdiction. All contracting states would be compelled to offer jurisdiction founded on required bases, and any resulting judgment would be entitled to recognition and
enforcement in other contracting states. Since courts would not take jurisdiction on bases found in
the "prohibited" list, only limited exceptions to recognition would apply. Any jurisdictional basis not
included on one of the two lists would be permitted, but subject to review in the recognizing court
in the manner applicable absent a treaty.

